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On October 16,2001, Enron Corporation, a Houston-based energy
trading and distribution company famous for its advocacy of energy de-
regulation, announced a $1.01 billion nonrecurring charge related to
"losses associated with certain investments ... and early termination dur-
ing the third quarter of certain structured finance arrangements with a
previously disclosed entity."' Chairman and CEO Ken Lay reassured in-
vestors about the strength of the company's core businesses, said he was
"very confident in [Enron's] strong earnings outlook" and "reaffirmed"
that the company was "on track to continue strong earnings growth."
Nevertheless, the write-offs produced a third-quarter loss of more than
$600 million and surprised Wall Street. Moreover, The Wall Street Journal
reported that $35 million of the losses derived from business dealings
with partnerships managed by the company's CFO, Andrew S. Fastow.'
The bad news, the reported conflict of interest, an ensuing SEC in-
vestigation, and the fall in Enron's stock price from the mid-$30s to the
low $20s, triggered a crisis of confidence in the company. Enron's energy
trading business, its crown jewel, depended crucially on solid finances,
since parties dealing with Enron were loath to assume significant coun-
terparty credit risk: a serious chance that Enron could not perform on a
contract to buy or sell energy meant that parties no longer would trade
with the firm. In desperation, Enron turned to a merger with its cross-
town rival, Dynergy, to save the day. Then, on November 8, Enron re-
leased a bombshell. The quarterly earnings statement restated (that is,
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reduced) previously reported earnings back to 1997 by $586 million, a
20-percent reduction in profits over the period, "mostly due to improp-
erly accounting for its dealings with partnerships run by some company
officers."' The quarterly statement revealed more about Enron's troubled
financial relationship with officer-managed partnerships.
The third-quarter report was devastating. The ramifications led
Dynergy to call off the merger. On December 2, barely six weeks after
the crisis first broke, Enron filed for bankruptcy. The turnabout was
remarkable. By some turnover measures, Enron had been the seventh-
largest company in the United States. Barely a year before, its stock had
crested at $90 per share, yielding a market capitalization of approxi-
mately $80 billion. The company was invariably mentioned in "most ad-
mired" lists of US companies; its CEO was lionized in Houston and a
nicknamed confidant of the President of the United States.
Enron's collapse triggered investigations by a "special committee"
of the Enron board, the SEC, the Justice Department, nearly a dozen
congressional committees, and various shareholder plaintiffs' attorneys.
The Enron board's special committee investigation suggested that a sub-
stantial fraction of the company's reported profits over a four-year pe-
riod had been the result of accounting manipulations. Early targets in-
cluded Enron's senior officers, the accountants at Arthur Andersen, the
Enron board and its various special oversight committees, and the law
firm Vinson & Elkins, which helped put together the controversial trans-
actions. Not only had Enron apparently filed false and misleading disclo-
sure documents, but also insiders allegedly sold stock and exercised op-
tions while publicly restating their faith in the company. By contrast,
rank-and-file employees were unable to sell their Enron stock locked
into 401(k) retirement plans. This particular element-privileged insiders
walking away with hundreds of millions of dollars in stock-related profits
while ordinary employees were losing a substantial chunk of life sav-
ings -added to the political saliency of the events.
The Enron case plays on many different dimensions, but its promi-
nence is not merely part of popular culture's obsession with scandal du
jour. Rather, the Enron situation challenges some of the core beliefs and
practices that have underpinned the academic analysis of corporate law
and governance, including mergers and acquisitions, since the 1980s.
These amount to an interlocking set of institutions that constitute
"shareholder capitalism," American-style, 2001, that we have been ag-
gressively promoting throughout the world. We have come to rely on a
3 John R. Emshwiller,et al, Enron Reduces Profitfor4 Years by 20%, Citing Dealings with Of-
ficers' Partnerships, Wall St J A3 (Nov 9,2001).
4 See Report ofInvestigation by the Special Investigation Committee of the Board of Directors
of Enron Corporation 4-5,14-15 (Feb 1, 2002), available online at <http://newsfindlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/enron/sicreport/indexhtml> (visited Feb 19,2002).
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particular set of assumptions about the connection between stock market
prices and underlying economic realities; the reliability of independent
auditors, financial standards, and copious disclosure in protecting the in-
tegrity of financial reporting; the efficacy of corporate governance in
monitoring managerial performance; the utility of stock options in align-
ing managerial and shareholder interests, and the value of employee
ownership as both an incentive device as well as a retirement planning
tool.
In particular, I want to assert that Enron raises at least the following
problems for the received model of corporate governance:
First, it provides another set of reasons to question the strength of
the efficient market hypothesis, because Enron's stock price reached diz-
zying heights despite transparently irrational reliance on its auditors'
compromised certification.
Second, it undermines the corporate governance mechanism, the
monitoring board, that has been offered as a substitute for unfettered
shareholder access to the market for corporate control. In particular, the
board's capacity to protect the integrity of financial disclosure has not
kept pace with the increasing reliance on stock price performance in
measuring and rewarding managerial performance.
Third, it suggests the existence of tradeoffs in the use of stock op-
tions in executive compensation because of the potential pathologies of
the risk-preferring management team.
Fourth, it shows the poor fit between stock-based employee com-
pensation and retirement planning. More generally, it raises questions
about the shift in retirement planning towards defined contribution
plans, which make employees risk-bearers and financial planners, and
away from defined benefit plans, which impose some of the risk and fi-
duciary planning obligations on firms.!
I. THE EFFiCIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
Although the efficient market hypothesis is a useful null hypothesis
about the workings of a well-developed capital market, sophisticated ap-
plication in policy settings requires awareness of its limits as well as its
power. The 1987 stock market crash, which in retrospect still seems like a
random quantum fluctuation, and the recent dot.corn exuberance, which
looks like a classic bubble, both give ample evidence of those limitations.
Even if it is the case that the prevailing stock price is the best available
estimate of expected future cash flows, "best" may not be very good in
some cases. But Enron seems to demonstrate those limits in a new way. If
the dot.com boom, for example, was a sectoral gold rush, Enron's price
5 For a wide-ranging account of the Enron collapse, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the
Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Thlane L Rev (forthcoming 2002).
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escalation (hitting a multiple of sixty on trailing earnings) showed how
markets can ignore the handwriting on the wall for a single firm. It
seemed barely possible that the Internet was about to become the prime
medium for transactions in the United States and that the firms that
staked their claims first would achieve increasing (and enormous) re-
turns to scale. The failure of markets to assess adequately the earnings
prospects at Enron is a more granular failure and thus more troubling.
How can the market price so widely diverge from intrinsic value despite
the firm-specific scrutiny that market institutions, including a battalion of
securities analysts, bring to bear on such a widely held stock? Even if En-
ron lacked candor-indeed, actively misled-about its true financial con-
dition, wasn't enough known to sophisticated market participants about
the company's murky finances so that efficient markets never should
have placed such a high value on Enron's stock?
The argument has a few steps. First, it was known and widely dis-
cussed in the analytic community that Enron's financial structure was
highly complex and that the bodies were buried in off-balance sheet enti-
ties that were described cryptically in Enron's disclosure documents. No
one on the outside really understood Enron's financial condition, but
they also knew they did not know. As one analyst put it, Enron was a
"faith" stock. Yet such willful obscurity ordinarily leads to skepticism
rather than belief. Enron could have disclosed more but did not. It rev-
eled in information asymmetry. What were we to infer from this: that it
had a secret, nonpatentable elixir for moneymaking (that investment
banks would not have already shopped to every other large firm)? Or
rather that full disclosure would have been embarrassing? George Aker-
lof just won a Nobel Prize for providing the answer to that question.' In
other words, in an efficient market, Enron should have been a "lemons"
stock instead of a "faith" stock.
Not so simple, you might say: Enron's accountants at Arthur Ander-
sen certified that the financial statements "fairly presented" the overall
financial picture of the company, and the reputational capital of a Big
Five accounting firm credibly bonds Andersen's certification. Andersen's
failure was a surprise, you might say. But, in fact, it seems to have been a
foreseeable failure. That Andersen had a lot to lose from a bad audit is
insufficient. No one who observed the firm-threatening bridge loans
made in leveraged transactions in the 1980s by investment bankers eager
for a success fee can believe that there is necessarily a link between what
is rational for the firm and what actions may be taken by the firm's self-
interested agents. Much depends on the way the firm manages the inter-
6 George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q J Econ 488,489-92 (1970) (using the car market as an example to model the economic costs of
dishonesty in the marketplace).
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nal moral hazard problems. On the basis of what we knew before the En-
ron collapse, the credibility of Andersen's certification had been severely
compromised, first because it had permitted its independence as a firm to
be fatally undermined, and second, because the internal governance of
Andersen was insufficient to control potentially aberrant behavior by its
partners.
Much has already been said about the problems raised by letting ac-
counting firms cross-sell various consulting services to their audit clients.7
As one of my colleagues pithily put it, "The batter ought to worry about
the umpire who is selling life insurance to the pitcher." But the issue
bears close examination for what it says about the credibility of Ander-
sen's certification.
The most important guarantor of an accountant's independence is
that its firing is highly salient. This is a material event: it must be dis-
closed on a Schedule 8-K and even if the accountant breathes not a word
about the precipitating facts (and the accountant may shout from the
rooftop), it will trigger scrutiny and inquiry. Firing the accounting firm is
thus a "high visibility sanction" that may well cause more harm to the
sanctioning company (and its officers and directors) than to the account-
ant, and therefore it cannot credibly be threatened to bring into line an
accountant who disagrees with management about an important ac-
counting matter. Indeed, too vigorous an effort to force a particular ac-
counting treatment may well trigger an accountant's resignation, also a
material event.
This picture changes dramatically when the accounting firm begins
to cross-sell consulting services. It is not that the accountant now has
more at stake in the relationship and thus would lose more if fired by the
company. Nor is it simply that the accountant may now have a particular
reason to please, or at least not alienate, the client who may buy addi-
tional services, and may even hope that cooperation on difficult account-
ing questions will be appreciated as part of a total client relationship.
Rather, it is that the client now has available a repertoire of "low-
visibility sanctions" to discipline the accountant's behavior. If the ac-
countant is resistant, a contract may be withheld or not renewed (or if
the accountant is cooperative, the reverse). But unlike the firing, these
disciplinary measures will not be disclosed. (Even if the total amount of
the accountant's consulting services is disclosed, the investor will not
have a full picture of the accountant-issuer relationship, because the dis-
7 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., TheAcquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries,
Auditor Independence and the Governance ofAccounting at 16-17, Columbia Law School Center for
Law and Economics Studies Working Paper No 191 (May 2001), available online at
<http://papers.ssm.com/id=270944> (visited Feb 19,2002) (suggesting that auditors also selling non-
audit services to corporate clients can no longer be gatekeepers whose revenues from clients are too
small for an auditor to risk its reputation in agreeing to an accounting irregularity).
2002] 1237
The University of Chicago Law Review
closure will not reveal the set of potential contracts.) Thus the issuer now
has credible threats against an accountant who disagrees with manage-
ment on an important issue. Moreover, the issuer now knows the ac-
countant's type: No accounting firm that prizes its independence above
all else would put itself in a position where that independence is so read-
ily undermined. To push the argument further: this may be why there are
two polar equilibria in the bundling of auditing and consulting services.
Accountants cannot afford to compete on their relative independence.
The willingness to expose oneself to low-visibility sanctions -the sacri-
fice of inherent independence-offers such a competitive advantage in
attracting audit clients that there will be a race to the bottom.
There is a related cultural factor associated with consulting that also
tends to undermine the credibility of the accountant's certification. The
press often has referred to the bundling of auditing and glamorous in-
formation technology consulting. But the more common, and more in-
sidious, bundle may be auditing plus tax planning, because of the carry-
over mindset from "tax planning" into "accounting planning." Tax plan-
ners provide value by structuring a company's transactions so as to
minimize tax, applying a formalist's approach to the constraints of the
tax law against a background interpretive norm of "reasonable basis." If
a close, ingenious reading of the Code and the regulations permits a re-
shaping of economic reality to minimize taxes, then excelsior. Whatever
the ultimate social desirability of such gamesmanship, at least it serves
the narrow shareholder interest of maximizing after-tax income, that is,
increasing the cash in the corporate till. But this tax planning approach
all too readily carries over to "accounting planning," in which the ac-
countant aggressively construes accounting rules to maximize reported
income irrespective of less illuminating disclosure to the ultimate client,
the shareholders. Accounting rules, like tax rules, become the subject of
professional manipulation, despite a potentially distorted portrayal of
the underlying economic reality. The ingenious evasion wins a merit
badge and perhaps additional compensation Thus "independent" ac-
countants become part of the management "team." Moreover, the bal-
ance sheet is disaggregated, as each successive transaction is evaluated
on a stand-alone basis against the accounting rules, myopically applied.
So in addition to the low-visibility sanctions, consulting can create a cul-
ture that undermines the capacity of the accountant to make the arm's
length judgment about public financials that must "fairly present" the
underlying economic realities taken as a whole.
Yet all of this is known to sophisticated investors. The sharply dimin-
ished value of Andersen's certification for a company like Enron with
8 The Enron Special Committee report confirms Andersen's role in helping to structure En-
ron's off-balance-sheet entities despite the obvious disclosure deficit that was created.
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complicated accounting, abundant consulting opportunities, and obvious
accounting planning should have been impounded in Enron's price from
the get-go. Apparently, it was not.
There is a second compromising element of the value of Andersen's
certification, the weakness of its internal governance mechanisms in con-
trolling the behavior of the firm's partners-the internal agency prob-
lem.9 The previous paragraphs addressed the independence of Andersen
as a firm, but of course services were delivered by specific agents of the
firm, its Houston partners. It now seems that the compensation of the
Houston partners was significantly tied to their client billings both for
auditing services and for consulting services. Enron might have been a
relatively small client for Andersen, the firm, but it was the largest client
for its Houston office, and, for the Enron relationship partners, perhaps
their only significant client. The forces that would undermine the inde-
pendence of the firm are much magnified in the case of the relationship
partners. In a multi-office, multi-national firm like Andersen, it may be
economically rational to treat each office as a profit center and to tie a
significant portion of partner compensation to own-billings or office-
billings. But the consequent threat to the partner's independence and the
resulting risk to Andersen's reputation are foreseeable and seem virtu-
ally to compel an appropriate internal monitoring mechanism. The dis-
parity between the value of the Houston partners' share of Andersen's
reputation and the value to them of a continued (or more lucrative) En-
ron client relationship sets up an obvious moral hazard problem. This
problem is compounded by the interaction with the first compromising
factor. That is, the low-visibility sanctions associated with the bundling of
audit and consulting services have particular compromising force at the
relationship partner level because of the impact of lucrative consulting
contracts on relationship partner compensation.
There are at least two obvious ways to monitor. First, an internal
"inspector general" might provide disinterested internal review of impor-
tant accounting judgments made by the Houston partners, an internal
auditor's audit. Second, partners might rotate among offices (for the
same reason that bank officers frequently rotate). Neither of these
mechanisms, nor any other, seems to have been used by Andersen. In-
deed, it seems that the Houston office could reject accounting judgments
from Chicago headquarters with impunity.'
9 This section benefited particularly from conversations with Jon Macey.
10 For accounts of the cultural and monitoring failures at Andersen, see Ken Brown and Jona-
than Weil, HowAndersen'S Embrace of ConsultingAltered the Culture oftheAuditing Firm,Wall StJ
Cl (Mar 12,2002); Ianthe Jeanne Dugan,Did You Hear the OneAbout theAccountant? It's Not Very
Funny, wall St J Al (Mar 14, 2002).
Andersen's internal monitoring failure is one of the genuine puzzles about Enron.After all,An-
dersen's business, its core competence, if you will, is anticipating internal agency problems, especially
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But this absence of internal controls was no secret. It was widely
known, one presumes, to accounting sophisticates, and thus the conse-
quent undermining of the credibility of Andersen's certification should
have been impounded in Enron's price. Yet throughout the period that
Enron was assembling its deceptive array of off-balance-sheet partner-
ships and special purpose entities, its stock soared.
How are we to interpret the gradual fall in Enron's stock price dur-
ing 2001, in absolute and market-adjusted terms, despite steadily increas-
ing reported earnings during the period? The stock price hovered around
$80 per share in January and February, drifting down to $60 in March
and April, falling to $50 in the summer and to $40 by early fall. Yet the
company was reporting favorable operating results, including substantial
increases in quarterly earnings per share, an 18 percent increase for the
first quarter, a 32 percent increase for the second quarter. Perhaps there
was information leakage from the partnership participants, who pos-
sessed nonpublic deal documents that could have revealed the potential
fragility of Enron's accounting alchemy, or perhaps the pressure of skep-
tical short sellers was having an effect. This provides only limited vindica-
tion of the efficient market hypothesis because of the slow correction of
the initial overpricing. Indeed, the pattern is consistent with an under-
supply of arbitrage in the presence of "noise traders," one of the by-now
classic explanations of the limitations on market efficiency."
In short, Enron disturbs the efficient market hypothesis. The only
compelling reason not to assume the worst about Enron's deliberately
obscure financial statements was because of Andersen's certification, yet
the market "knew" that the certification had little value."
in the financial realm, and figuring out how to minimize the consequent risks through internal moni-
toring systems. How is it that this shoemaker failed to make shoes for itself?. One benign explanation
is that Andersen, the firm, failed to realize its evolution from a partnership of accounting profession-
als, "certified public accountants" constrained by a strong sense of professional ethics, to a profit-
maximizing business organization using high-powered incentive compensation schemes. The internal
monitoring systems that might suffice in the case of the former are woefully inadequate in the case of
the latter. In the course of pursuing consulting business and in devising compensation systems de-
signed to maximize partner incomes, Andersen underwent a "norms shift" that required a matching
change in the internal monitoring system. Perhaps the partners were unable to look at themselves
hard enough in the mirror (or to hold a mirror to the firm).
This observation may have implications for the large law firm, another organization of profes-
sionals, "lawyers," which in general is moving towards incentive-based compensation. The internal
monitoring system may have been appropriate for a small organization of "partners" who were com-
pensated on a lock-step system and who may have highly valued a sense of professional identity, but
will not be appropriate for a profit-maximizing large firm using high-powered incentive compensa-
tion schemes. Not only will the sense of "professional ethics" change, but such an environment will
put greater pressure on such constraints. Law firms, like accounting firms, may find themselves at sig-
nificant risk in the absence of strenuous internal monitoring.
11 For a summary, see Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets:An Introduction to Behavioral Fi-
nance 28-52 (Oxford 2000).
12 The suggestion that Enron's $90 stock price could be justified as the weighted average of in-
vestor expectations (for example, a 50 percent chance that Enron was worth $180 a share, a 50 per-
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II. BOARD-CENTERED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The efficient market hypothesis has been one of the underpinnings
of the argument for shareholder choice in the decision whether to accept
a hostile takeover bid at a premium to the market price. (It is by no
means a necessary step to that conclusion, however, since the possibility
of a gap between prevailing market price and intrinsic value hardly re-
solves the question of whether management has markedly better infor-
mation and superior evaluative skills so as to outweigh the agency prob-
lems.) Those who argued most strenuously against unfettered share-
holder access to hostile bids, for management's right to "just say no,"
have offered the visible hand of robust corporate governance instead of
the market in corporate control as a solution to the agency problems of
large public corporations. That is, the appropriate remedy for the prob-
lem of the potentially self-interested or incompetent managerial team is
said to be the monitoring board.The major features are independent di-
rectors, specialized committees (especially an audit committee) consist-
ing exclusively of independent directors to perform crucial monitoring
functions, and clear charter of board authority. Some have argued addi-
tionally for stock-based compensation for directors, better to align their
interests with shareholders.
Enron is an embarrassment for this position. Its board was a splen-
did board on paper, fourteen members, only two insiders. Most of the
outsiders had relevant business experience, a diverse set including ac-
counting backgrounds, prior senior management and board positions,
and senior regulatory posts. Most of the directors owned stock, some in
significant amounts, and almost all had received stock options or phan-
tom stock as part of the director compensation package. The Audit
Committee had a state-of-the-art charter, attached to the 2001 Proxy
Statement for all to admire, which made it the "overseer of the Com-
pany's reporting process and internal controls" and gave it "direct access
to financial, legal, and other staff and consultants of the Company" and
the power to retain other accountants, lawyers, or consultants as it
thought advisable. But if the report of the Enron Special Investigation
Committee is accurate, the board was ineffectual in the most fundamen-
tal way, the Audit Committee particularly somnolent if not supine. It
turns out that the independence of virtually every board member, includ-
cent chance that it was worth nothing) is consistent with the usual lemons equilibrium. Purchasers
who are unable to determine whether the good is high or low quality assume they are purposefully
being kept in the dark; they offer the low-quality price, not an average-quality price. (More techni-
cally, the value of Enron was not a "normally distributed random variable." At the very least, the
"low-quality" outcome should have been much more heavily weighted than the "high-quality" out-
come.) Note also that the $90 stock price reflected a price-earnings multiple of sixty. It is hard to
imagine $90 per Enron share as the expected value of a probability distribution that gave significant
weight to a low-quality outcome.
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ing Audit Committee members, was undermined by side payments of one
kind or another. 3 Independence also was compromised by the bonds of
long service and familiarity.
Obviously one bad board does not an argument undo, but it does
reveal a certain weakness with the board as a governance mechanism.
Much is made of the heuristic biases of investors that undercut the reli-
ability of stock market prices, but Enron reveals that the heuristic failings
of small groups may be even more pronounced. The gap between what
the Enron board knew and could have/should have known is far greater
than the valuation gap between intrinsic and market values that typically
emerges from competitive markets (one-third, Fisher Black famously
suggested). Things at Enron appeared to be going so well, and manage-
ment told such a convincing story, that a tell-tale sign of trouble-the
proposal to suspend the corporate ethics code to permit conflicted trans-
actions by a senior executive, an extraordinary request -did not stir the
antennae. Skepticism, suspicion, and healthy scrutiny were inconsistent
with the board's culture. Yet this sort of cognitive dissonance, which is
probably wide-spread at corporations that appear successful, is also
probably very common even at corporations in some trouble. Boards al-
ways seem to think that hostile bids undervalue the firm.
The Enron board failure also may reveal a certain tension in the
current modes of director compensation and selection. Recruitment of
directors who are qualified to be board members of a large public com-
pany may require substantial compensation, especially for directors on
time-consuming or high-profile committees such as the audit committee.
Yet high levels of compensation may compromise director independence,
since a director's sharp questioning of senior management may lead to
subtle pressures against his/her renomination. Moreover, stock-based di-
rector compensation may enhance the board's vigor as a shareholder
agent but also increase its ambivalence about uncovering embarrassing
facts that will reduce the share price. Finally, directors' independence can
be compromised by both "soft conflicts," such as significant charitable
contributions to an institution where a director may have a strong affilia-
tion, or more direct conflicts, such as consulting arrangements. Both of
these sorts of conflicts open the door to low-visibility sanction, this time
against director independence. The failure to renominate a director is
high-visibility, and, much as the accountant firing, may stir inquiry,
whereas the making or not of a charitable contribution, or entering into
or not of a consulting arrangement, are much lower visibility and thus in
practice may undercut independence even more.




One possible way to mitigate some of these tensions is to change the
nominating and compensation practices for what might be called "trus-
tee" directors in large public corporations. Even where the nominating
committees consist of nominally independent directors, the CEO often
plays a significant backstage role. Perhaps the members of the audit
committee, for example, should, in ordinary course, be "self-nominated,"
that is, the committee should have the power to designate the managerial
nominees for directors who will be expected to serve on the audit com-
mittee (except that a proxy contestant should have the power to make an
initial designation of its own audit committee nominees). This would
provide a useful safeguard of independence." Compensation for audit
committee members should be different, a flat fee (or time-charged)
rather than incentive-based. Audit committee members are in a real
sense the board's and thus the corporation's compliance officers.To pro-
tect both the reality and appearance of their willingness to ferret out bad
facts, they should not receive compensation closely tied to the corpora-
tion's profits or stock price. Finally, charitable contributions or other side
payments related to a director's service should simply be eliminated, if
not for all directors, then certainly for audit committee members and
perhaps other "trustee" directors.
A group of "trustee directors" subject to different nomination and
compensation rules differs, to be sure, from the usual U.S. pattern of gen-
eralist, nonconstituency directors. For example, employee-designated di-
rectors are a decided rarity in U.S. public corporations, found most
prominently in an employee-owned firm like United Air Lines. The
board's most important decisions typically involve matters of overall
business strategy or executive leadership in which "trustee"-type consid-
erations may not loom large, and arguably a single-minded focus on
shareholder value assures the best outcomes. But a trustee director class
would not disrupt the functioning of the board. In all probability, they
would have the same general attitudes toward shareholder value as other
directors, since ultimately they are elected by and accountable to the
shareholders generally, not a particular constituency. The members of
this class would be strengthened to function on behalf of shareholders in
circumstances where independence from management may be crucial.
The "trustee director" approach may seem more attractive when
compared to other approaches in light of Enron-type board failure. One
alternative is to raise legal liability for directors for breach of the duty of
care, or more particularly, breach of the duty of managerial oversight.
14 For another mechanism to protect director independence, see Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate
Governance Debate,45 Stan L Rev 985,990-96 (1993) (proposing to institute publicly traded finan-
cial intermediaries that would make huge investments in small portfolios).
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This could be done in several different ways: expanding the circumstance
in which liability might be attached,"5 narrowing the scope of director
liability exculpation statutes to increase exposure to significant monetary
loss, or, to similar effect, curtailing the availability of corporate
indemnification or directors and officers liability insurance. Another
alternative is to create mechanisms that more potently "forfeit" the
reputational "bond" that directors allegedly post as a guarantee of good
performance. For example, in cases of significant board oversight failure,
the SEC could bring a proceeding to bar the directors from serving on
other public boards or institutional investors could work privately to
establish such a practice. (A lesser sanction would be a disclosure
requirement associated with director nomination of a party who had
served on the board of a company sanctioned by the SEC for a serious
disclosure violation.) Each of these alternatives depends upon accurate
ex post determination of board failure followed by application of
appropriate sanctions, monetary or reputational. It is a familiar move in
the debate to observe that such measures may have the perverse effect
of discouraging board service by the well-qualified, especially for
corporations facing significant business challenges.
By contrast, the "trustee director" approach is structural: it aims to
affect the overall performance of the board by buttressing the particu-
larly important role that certain directors must perform without chang-
ing the applicable legal duties. It represents the next stage in the evolu-
tion of board governance of the large public corporation, in which firms
and managers must anticipate the pressures (and temptations) of com-
petitive capital markets.
An "audit committee" for public corporations is itself a relatively
recent innovation, a product of the 1970s corporate governance move-
ment.'6 In light of the increasing reliance on stock prices as the measure
of both managerial performance and compensation, the audit committee
has become an increasingly important institutional complement for the
control of the associated moral hazard problems. If relatively small
changes in earnings, or the growth rate of earnings, have significant im-
pact on the stock price, and if management receives a significant portion
of its compensation through stock options, the temptations are obvious.
Indeed, the increasingly widespread practice of "earnings management"
was the basis for the SEC's very recent efforts to strengthen the role and
accountability of audit committees. 7 The Enron case reemphasizes the
15 See In Re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litigation, 698 A2d 959,967-70 (Del Ch
1996) (describing circumstances in which liability is currently attached).
16 See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 3.05 Reporter's
Notes (ALI 1994).
17 See generally Gregory S. Rowland, Note, Earnings Management, the SEC and Corporate
Governance: Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 Colum L Rev 168
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importance of audit committee independence and vigilance and suggests
possible structural weaknesses in its present conception. Audit commit-
tees would be strengthened if their members were "trustee directors."
II. STOCK-BASED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION
Stock-based compensation has emerged as a major tool in the em-
ployment contracts, express and implied, for both senior managers and
employees. The overly high-powered incentives of executive stock option
mega-grants may have contributed to Enron's downfall.
Stock options have become an increasingly important element in
executive compensation. In part, this has developed from appreciation of
the need to align managers' and shareholders' incentives to solve genu-
ine problems of legitimately different perspectives. This has "finance"
elements and "real" elements. On finance: managers and shareholders
start with different attitudes toward firm-specific risk. Managers gener-
ally make large firm-specific human capital investments in their firms
and thus are risk-averse; shareholders in public firms generally are rea-
sonably well-diversified (or at least have the opportunity to be) and thus
are generally risk-neutral. Managers therefore might well choose pro-
jects with lower expected returns but less variance than shareholders
otherwise would prefer. Executive stock options can solve this mismatch
by compensating executives for the additional risk of the shareholder-
preferred projects.
Stock options also can give managers particular incentives to under-
take difficult measures that may even reduce the riskiness of the firm but
that may be personally stressful. For example, competition inevitably
means that large firms should exit from some losing businesses, close
plants, redeploy assets and make other moves that will disrupt the lives
of employees and other stakeholders, but that also will increase the value
of the firm. Stock options have become a dominant mode of perform-
ance-based pay for senior managers. Options are favored in part because
of a peculiar mismatch between accounting and tax consequences: the
grant of stock options is not booked as an "expense" that reduces ac-
counting earnings, yet, when exercised, options produce a tax deduction
for the firm equal to the difference between the market value of the
stock and the exercise price of the option. Stock options also can serve a
coordinating function among the senior management team, promoting
(2002). Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt focused on audit committees as a governance response
to earnings management in 1998.This led to a report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving
the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees in 1999 and subsequent standard setting by the
stock exchanges and rulemaking by the SEC, effective in 2000. See The Blue Ribbon Committee,
available online at <http.//www.nyse.com/content/publications/NT00006286.html> (visited Mar 23,
2002).
2002] 1245
The University of Chicago Law Review
team efforts to increase the value of the "firm" and mitigating the ten-
dency to aggrandize one's own particular "division" of the firm. These
are examples of the "real" motives for stock options.
Stock options also have emerged as particularly important in con-
temporary mergers and acquisitions practice because of the power that
courts and legislatures have given to target boards to refuse a hostile bid.
As I have argued previously, stock options have become the currency
with which stockholders have bought back the endowment that courts
and legislatures have so generously conferred on management."' This
works through the senior executive employment contract. At the outset
of the contract the senior executive is given a pile of stock options that
will vest over perhaps a ten-year period, a golden handcuff, you might
say. But there is a crucial "acceleration clause" that provides for immedi-
ate vesting of the options in the event of a change in control. An execu-
tive who fought fiercely in the 1980s to preserve position, perquisites, and
power is now quite willing to sell.
In each case, executive stock options are used to solve a problem of
incentive compatibility. But frankly, no one really knows what is the op-
timal level of option grant: what level of stock option compensation will
make an executive risk-neutral like the shareholders, or willing to bite
the bullet on layoffs, or willing to accept a premium bid? Indeed, it is
likely that each problem may have a different solution as to number,
term, and exercise price. The optimal level also may vary depending
upon the utility curve of the particular executive, which may be affected,
for example, by outside wealth. So at best, the actual grant must trade off
among a number of objectives. Nor is it realistic to think that the market
in executive services functions very well in setting the level of option
grants, particularly because the present accounting treatment of options
makes them nominally costless to the corporation. But as option grants
become increasingly larger, two pathologies may arise that seem to have
been at work in Enron: first, the fraudster, and second, the risk-
preferring executive. (The more commonly identified problem, share-
holder dilution, is merely distributive, not a potential threat to the exis-
tence of the firm.)
Stock options have value, of course, only if at exercise they are "in
the money," meaning the stock price is above the exercise price. If option
grants are very large and exercisable in the relatively near term, then a
positive swing in the stock price can make the senior executives immedi-
ately very rich. Even if the stock price falls back, the well-timed execu-
tive option exercise is a life-changing experience. More formally, the
Black-Scholes option pricing model instructs us that the value of the ex-




ecutive's stock option will be increasing both in the value of the underly-
ing security and the variance (since stock options are issued "at the
money"). So managers with a rich load of options have incentives to get
the stock price high by any means necessary, fraud included. In particu-
lar, they have incentives to increase the riskiness of the firm, including
projects that offer lower expected returns but higher variance. This will
reduce the value of the firm for risk-neutral shareholders but has the po-
tential to increase the value of managers' firm-related investments in
cases where the gain in option holdings exceeds the loss to human capi-
tal. Managers become risk-preferring. Both pathologies, fraud and costly
risk-taking, appear to have occurred in Enron. Enron became a hedge
fund, taking leveraged bets in exotic markets that if successful would
produce a huge, disproportionate bonanza for its executives. In particu-
lar, for a management team that had profited from previous option exer-
cises, the downside seemed a problem only for the shareholders.
IV. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP AND RETIREMENT PLANNING
The Enron case exposes the weirdness of brigading employee stock
ownership, used principally for incentive purposes, with employee re-
tirement planning. First, employer stock is a strange tool for delivering
incentives to employees. For all but senior management, the action of
any individual employee will have negligible impact on the stock price.
Even a major contribution to enhancing the profitability of a division is
likely to go unnoticed in the consolidated results of a large public com-
pany. More precisely tailored pay-for-performance measures, bonuses,
commissions, promotions, and other rewards for delivering specific re-
sults are bound to be far more effective in providing incentives. 9 Too
stringent a focus on ownership of employer stock for its incentive effects
may lead to employee disillusionment when strong individual efforts are
not rewarded by a stock price increase. Rather, ownership of employer
stock may serve other organizational goals. The stock price, which re-
flects the public market's evaluation of the company, is a salient bench-
mark of the company's success. Management can use this focal point to
rally the troops, to explain the need for difficult economic decisions, to
build a sense of a common enterprise and common culture.The stock is a
common currency within the company. Unlike a grand title or corporate
power, it is infinitely divisible. Every employee can have some; it is
"commons" stock. Employer stock can also serve as a form of profit-
sharing that does not require a cash outlay by the company and which
receives favorable accounting treatment.
19 For a related view, see Saul LevmorePuzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149
U Pa L Rev 1901,1905-08 (2001) (comparing the incentive effects of stock options and bonuses).
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The tie-in to retirement planning makes employer stock particularly
odd as an incentive device. Employer stock is typically placed into a con-
tributory pension plan, for example, a 401(k) plan or an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan, which places strict limits on the employee's ability to
sell the stock, and even after sale, locks up the proceeds until the em-
ployee's retirement. Thus the employee is required to take a very long
view towards the benefits of employer stock appreciation. Consumption
is postponed a long time. In theory, there should be substitution among
various savings vehicles, so employer stock appreciation in a retirement
account should reduce other savings, increasing the amount available for
consumption, but the mental arithmetic seems not to work that way in
practice. Note that this pattern also is very different from the incentives
granted to senior managers-stock options and other stock-based com-
pensation that begin to vest and become exercisable as quickly as one
year after their grant. In other words, the wealthier senior managers
whose declining marginal utility should make them more likely candi-
dates for incentives that pay off in the long run receive short-fused stock-
based incentive compensation. If that is the right payoff horizon for in-
centivizing senior management, then the retirement planning link to
stock-based incentives for line employees postpones the payoff long past
the point of incentive compatibility.
The limited value of employer stock as an incentive device in these
circumstances is, of course, the much less serious half of the retirement
plan problem. Enron employees were heavily invested in employer stock
in their 401(k) plans. An estimated $1.3 billion of the plan's $2.1 billion
in pension assets consisted of now-worthless Enron stock.2' To a signifi-
cant extent, this was the result of the peculiar accounting and tax incen-
tives that reduced Enron's cost of pension contributions if it used its own
stock combined with the pension plan rules that limited employee sales
of Enron-contributed stock until age fifty. Presumably, those tax incen-
tives could be redirected to reward greater diversification. But employee
choices to remain undiversified also accounted for a significant portion
of these losses. The extent to which Enron's employees - probably much
higher on the financial sophistication curve than most-chose to take on
so much uncompensated firm-specific risk is stunning.
Enron shows why we might regret the diminishment of the defined
benefit pension plan and the shifting of retirement planning risk onto
20 See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The
Case of UnitedAirlines, in Klaus J. Hopt, et al, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the
Art and Emerging Research 387,433-34 (Oxford 1998).
21 Theo Francis and Ellen Schultz, Enron Faces Suits by 401(k) Plan Participants, Wall St J C1
(Nov 23, 2001). Of course, these figures overstate the employees' true loss since the value of Enron
stock was pumped up by the accounting manipulation.
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employees.2 Defined benefit plans, which promise a fixed payout based
on an employee's longevity with the firm and his/her final salary, are col-
lateralized by funding requirements set by the Employee Retirement Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA) and managed by fiduciaries who operate
under a prudent investor standard that emphasizes the value of diversifi-
cation. Defined contribution plans generally, and 401(k) plans specifi-
cally, are the fastest-growing part of the private retirement planning uni-
verse.Z Employees contribute a before-tax portion of their salaries, and
employers often match, especially with employer stock, but all of the risk
associated with the individual's management of his/her retirement sav-
ings is borne individually. Ironically, the problem until recently was that
individuals typically underweighted equities, preferring instead less risky
bonds and other fixed-income investments. Such conservatism meant
that they would not attain retirement income targets. The Enron experi-
ence of a poorly diversified 401(k) plan, too much in employer equity, is
of course just the opposite. It seems likely that the failures of individual
retirement portfolio management will cluster around these two poles.
Since pension plans are voluntary for the employer, reform needs to
avoid imposition of significant new costs. But the devolution to individu-
als of both the responsibility for retirement-plan planning and the in-
vestment risk of their choices seems unwise.
CONCLUSION
The Enron matter will prove to be a very important event in the his-
tory of American shareholder capitalism. Many of the important institu-
tions were subjected to a stress test at a particular firm and the outcome
was poor. The real concern is that the gross overreaching at Enron is
symptomatic of troubling if not egregious behavior elsewhere. Already,
reform seems on the way, in the possible restructuring of accounting
firms and the establishment of a new accounting self-regulator; in clearer
standards under GAAP about the treatment of specialized financing ve-
hicles; in new elements of mandatory disclosure; in efforts to redefine
director independence. But Enron also reminds us that there is a
problem that cannot be solved, but can only be contained, in the tension
22 For some discussion of the risks of defined-contribution, Enron-type plans for employees,
see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Individual Responsibility for the Investment of Retirement Savings: A Caution-
ary View, 64 Brooklyn L Rev 1037,1038 (1998) (discussing the poor assessment by individuals of the
risks that arise from the volatility of stocks versus bonds); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions
and the New Economic Order,97 Colum L Rev 1519,1541-45 (1997) (noting employer obligations to
employees under defined-benefits plans, and the undermining of those plans in the current economic
trade-liberation order).
23 See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President 71 (2002), available
online at <http'//w3.access.gpo.gov/eopl> (visited Apr 18,2002) (including a chart comparing the
growth in numbers of defined-contribution plan participants with the growth in numbers of defined
benefit plan participants).
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that cannot be solved, but can only be contained, in the tension between
imperfectly fashioned incentives and self-restraint.
